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Unity, Disunity and Vacuity: Constitutional Adjudication and the Common Law 
 
ROGER MASTERMAN AND SE-SHAUNA WHEATLE

 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The common law is often seen as a unifying and stabilising factor across and within 
jurisdictions; in the United Kingdom, for instance, the common law is appealed to as a 
familiar and certain alternative to the unpredictable and overweening impacts of European 
Human Rights Law.
1
 This is in spite of the common law’s propensity for reinvention, and in 
spite of the internal divisions and tensions within both the substance and methodologies of 
the common law. These ructions are in particular evidence in the constitutional common law 
and in the common law’s approach to the resolution of fundamental constitutional conflict.  
  Though primarily regarded as the vehicle for the realisation of the private law of 
obligations, the last twenty years have seen the English common law assume a distinctly 
constitutional character.
2
 The articulation of fundamental rights, though lacking the 
coherence and definitive character of a legislatively-endorsed bill of rights, had begun to 
form—prior to the sanction by statute of legislative review in the United Kingdom3—the 
backbone of a constitutional jurisdiction which aspired to partially regulate primary 
legislation for consistency with individual freedoms. Following the adoption of the Human 
Rights Act 1998, this nascent jurisdiction appeared to have reached its natural zenith, in the 
form of the principle of legality.
4
 But renewed judicial recourse to rights protected by the 
common law,
5
 alongside persistent claims as to the capacity of the common law as a control 
                                                 
 Our thanks are due to Mark Elliott and William Lucy for their comments on a previous draft.  
1 Conservative Party, Protecting Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing Britain’s Human 
Rights Laws (October 2014) 2.  
2 We acknowledge that the common law has long been considered to be an element of the broad constitutional 
fabric (eg AV Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 10th edn (London, Macmillan, 1967) 196 (‘Our constitution, 
in short, is a judge-made constitution, and it bears on its face all the features, good and bad, of judge-made 
law.’) or as a component of the ‘ancient constitution’ (on which see JGA Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and 
the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1957)).  In this piece, our focus is less on the place the common law within the constitution, 
more on the development and deployment by the courts of specific and substantive constitutional rights and 
principles.   
3 See Human Rights Act 1998, ss 3 and 4; Scotland Act 1998; Government of Wales Act 1998; Northern Ireland 
Act 1998.  
4 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131. 
5 eg R (on the application of Osborn) v Parole Board [2014] AC 1115; Kennedy v Information Commissioner 
[2015] AC 455; A v British Broadcasting Corporation [2015] AC 588. 
  
on legislative action,
6
 prompt consideration of the extent to which the common law can 
operate as a tool of proto-constitutional review.
7
  
The development of a constitutional dimension to the common law has seen it 
proclaimed as undertaking functions akin to those performed by a written constitution.
8
 Our 
enquiry is the extent to which the adoption of an explicitly constitutional dimension by the 
common law has prompted a departure from its accepted characteristics, holding the potential 
to destabilise its development. Judicial articulation of constitutional rights and statutes 
recognised at common law undoubtedly poses a challenge to the stability of the domestic 
constitutional order but also reveals a series of conflicts which threaten the capacity of the 
common law to unite or stabilise. Taking account of the incremental methods of the common 
law, its traditional adherence to doctrine and the judicial articulation of overarching 
constitutional principles, this paper examines the unity of the common law’s constitutional 
features and the coherence of that constitutional common law within the prevailing 
constitutional order.  
 
II.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND THE ORDINARY 
 
The Diceyan conflation of ordinary and constitutional law, as is well known, hindered the 
development of a distinct body of public law until the latter years of the twentieth century. 
Droit administratif, to Dicey, was ‘foreign to the spirit and traditions of our institutions’9 and 
undermined the idea of formal equality before the law. The consequence of this absence of a 
substantive distinction between the ordinary law and the nascent law applicable to public 
administration saw some of the most famous decisions in the canon grounded very firmly in 
private law causes of action.
10
 Gradually, administrative law established for itself a 
                                                 
6 eg Lord Woolf, ‘Droit Public—English Style’ [1995] PL 57, 69; R (on the application of Jackson) v Attorney 
General [2006] 1 AC 262, [102] and [159]; Moohan v Lord Advocate [2015] AC 901, [35].   
7 For a thorough-going defence of the constitutional capacity of the common law, see: TRS Allan, The 
Sovereignty of Law; Freedom, Constitution and Common Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013).  
8 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151, [64].  
9 Dicey (n 2) 332.   
10 eg Entick v Carrington 95 ER 807 (1765).   
  
distinctive character,
11
 and procedural exclusivity saw the prerogative writs and orders 
reserved to the sphere of judicial review of administrative action.
12
   
Emerging from this developing divergence, the common law has come to permit 
judicial scrutiny of administrative or executive powers, and increasingly can be seen to 
approach the subjection of legislative power to the controlling (or regulatory) influence of the 
common law. As such, the common law has begun to reveal the capacity to regulate not only 
executive or administrative discretion but also public power more broadly construed.
13
 While 
a body of ‘constitutional’ laws can be described as the cumulative consequence of the 
development of judicial review and other cases dealing with the regulation of public power, 
such decisions have been bolstered through the ability of judicial review to touch upon the 
exercise of legislative power, and through the reflection of a distinctly ‘constitutional’ 
approach to judicial decision making.  
The very idea of distinctly constitutional techniques of judicial reasoning is of course 
anathema to the orthodox Diceyan conceptualisation of constitutional law as the outgrowth of 
the ordinary law.
14
  However, the image of a uniform terrain of laws is no longer—if it ever 
was—an accurate reflection of the UK’s constitutional landscape. Practically, this transition 
is revealed in the increasingly complex evolution of the doctrine of implied repeal, a rule 
traditionally seen as the interpretive expression of that most orthodox and (once) sacrosanct 
constitutional doctrine—parliamentary supremacy. While implied repeal has been described 
as the doctrinal representation of the continuing supremacy of each successive Parliament,
15
 
faithful application of the doctrine also assumes—in normative and interpretive terms—
equality of status among all legislation, an assumption that has been subject to challenge in 
recent decades.  
The exposition of constitutional statutes by Laws LJ in Thoburn is heralded for 
piercing the myth of a plane constitutional surface.
16
 This feat was accomplished by, firstly, 
differentiating the nature of constitutional statutes from ordinary legislation:
17
 
                                                 
11 The foundations of modern administrative law were only secured in the latter half of the twentieth century 
(see Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40; Padfield v Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997; 
Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147; R Stevens, The English Judges: Their 
Role in the Changing Constitution (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005) ch 3).   
12 O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237.   
13 As Cane observes, the target of administrative law is ‘the day-to-day handling of public affairs particularly, 
but by no means exclusively, by what we call the “executive branch of government”’ whereas ‘constitutional 
law is concerned with the public domain in general’ (P Cane, Administrative Law, 4th edn (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 2004) 1–2.   
14 Dicey, (n 2) 203.. 
15 Vauxhall Estates v Liverpool Corporation [1932] 1 KB 733, 743 (Avory J).   
16 Cf Ellen Street Estates v Minister of Health [1934] 1 KB 590. 
  
We should recognise a hierarchy of Acts of Parliament: as it were ‘ordinary’ statutes 
and ‘constitutional’ statutes. […] a constitutional statute is one which (a) conditions 
the legal relationship between citizen and state in some general, overarching manner, 
or (b) enlarges or diminishes the scope of what we would now regard as fundamental 
constitutional rights. 
However, perhaps more constitutionally consequential was the explanation of the interpretive 
consequences of that distinction—specifically, the insulation of constitutional statutes from 
implied repeal: 
Ordinary statutes may be impliedly repealed. Constitutional statutes may not. For the 
repeal of a constitutional Act … to be effected by statute, the court would apply this 
test: is it shown that the legislature’s actual—not imputed, constructive or 
presumed—intention was to effect the repeal or abrogation? I think the test could only 
be met by express words in the later statute, or by words so specific that the inference 
of an actual determination to effect the result contended for was irresistible. The 
ordinary rule of implied repeal does not satisfy this test. Accordingly, it has no 
application to constitutional statutes.
18
 
On the basis of this reasoning, Laws LJ’s constitutional hierarchy of statutes was not simply a 
descriptive label, but a categorisation with clear normative implications.  
Thoburn has been characterised as evidencing a substantial, and dangerous, shift in 
the ‘constitutional firmament’19, yet, preceding Laws LJ’s identification of constitutional 
statutes are earlier judicial suggestions of the existence of a hierarchical normative order. The 
House of Lords in Nairn v University Court of St Andrews
20
 rejected an argument that the 
exclusion of women from the franchise in the 1868 Representation of the People Act was 
impliedly repealed by the Universities Election Amendment Act 1881 and the Universities 
Act 1889 which together permitted women’s admission to universities and required women 
college members to be issued with voting papers. Finding that the 1868 Act was not 
impliedly repealed, and thereby maintaining the discriminatory law, Lord Ashbourne 
reasoned that ‘[i]f it was intended to make a vast constitutional change in favour of women 
graduates, one would expect to find plain language and express statement’.21 There is 
                                                                                                                                                        
17 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2003] QB 151, [62].  
18 Thoburn (n 17) [63]. 
19 J Young and D Campbell, ‘The Metric Martyrs and the Entrenchment Jurisprudence of Lord Justice Laws’ 
[2002] PL 399, 405.  
20 [1909] AC 147 
21 Nairn (n 22) [163]. 
  
demonstrative constitutional reasoning displayed in the judgment, complete with the ordering 
of norms and identification of fundamental laws—which clearly construed laws regarding the 
franchise as possessing superior constitutional status—despite that the consequences in rights 
terms were firmly against the grain of current constitutional thought and practice. Nairn 
stands out as a clear precursor to the constitutional layering subsequently realised—and 
rendered generally applicable to all constitutional statutes
22—in Thoburn and subsequent case 
law on constitutional norms. With the endorsement of Thoburn by the Supreme Court in H v 
Lord Advocate
23
 and HS2,
24
 both the distinction between constitutional and ordinary 
legislation—and the interpretive consequences of such categorisation—were made 
concrete.
25
 Indeed, the constitutionalisation of the common law was ushered along by the 
more exacting ‘quasi-entrenchment’ laid down in H v Lord Advocate, through Lord Hope’s 
repeated incantations that only express enactment can result in repeal of a constitutional 
statue, thereby forestalling the possibility of repeal by irresistible inference as envisioned in 
Thoburn.
26
   
Alongside the qualification of implied repeal through the discovery of constitutional 
statutes, the turn towards a constitutional common law has been anchored in and facilitated 
by the principle of legality. Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s speech in R v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, ex parte Pierson, outlined the basic limitations that the principle imposed 
on government:
27
 
A power conferred by Parliament in general terms is not to be taken to authorise the 
doing of acts by the donee of the power which adversely affect the legal rights of the 
citizen or the basic principles on which the law of the United Kingdom is based unless 
the statute conferring the power makes it clear that such was the intention of 
Parliament. 
Lord Hoffmann’s subsequent formulation—in R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Simms—explained the constitutional impetus for requiring a clear 
statement from Parliament:
28
 
                                                 
22 F Ahmed and A Perry, ‘Constitutional Statutes’ (2017) 37 OJLS 461, 463.   
23 [2013] 1 AC 413. 
24 R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] 1 WLR 324.  
25 H v Lord Advocate (n 23) [30]; HS2 (n 24) [207]–[208]. 
26 F Ahmed and A Perry, ‘The quasi-entrenchment of constitutional statutes’ [2014] CLJ 514, 520-21. 
27 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Pierson [1998] AC 539, 575 (Lord Browne-
Wilkinson).  
28 Simms (n 4) 131. 
  
[T]he principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is 
doing and accept the political cost. Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by 
general or ambiguous words. This is because there is too great a risk that the full 
implications of their unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the 
democratic process. In the absence of express language or necessary implication to 
the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were 
intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual.  
Conceived of by Lord Hoffmann as primarily a vehicle for the realisation of individual rights, 
the ‘canonical’29 articulation of the principle of legality also indicates its secondary purpose, 
as a means by which English courts might enforce powers of review (‘principles of 
constitutionality’) not dissimilar to those exercised by explicitly constitutional courts. While 
the application of such principles would appear to fall short of providing overt support for a 
power of judicial strike down, they nonetheless appear to consciously position the court as a 
counter-majoritarian institution, capable of giving substantive effect to individual rights and 
constitutional principles via the processes of legislative interpretation.
30
  To this extent—and 
to the extent that the principle permits derogation from the apparent intent underpinning 
primary legislation—the principle of legality is a bold departure for a constitution 
traditionally accustomed to a deferential judicial branch.
31
 And though legislative 
development has also permitted the judiciary to wield constitutionally significant 
interpretative powers in defence of human rights,
32
 as Philip Sales has recognised, the 
development of the principle of legality further evinces a tension between the ordinary and 
the constitutional: ‘Section 3 of the [Human Rights Act 1998] and the principle of legality 
represent both continuity with earlier canons of construction looking to the object and 
purpose of the statute and various side constraints (such as the presumption against 
retrospective effect), and also a departure from them by reason of the greater interpretive 
discretion which they confer upon the courts.’33   
But while rhetorically powerful, the force of the principle of legality is undermined by 
two significant practical considerations. The first is its apparent weakness as a constitutional 
                                                 
29 HWR Wade and CF Forsyth, Administrative Law, 10th edn (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009) 22.  
30 For a fuller account see R Masterman and JEK Murkens, ‘Skirting Supremacy and Subordination: The 
Constitutional Authority of the United Kingdom Supreme Court’ [2013] PL 800.  
31 Masterman and Murkens (n 32) 802–804.  
32 Human Rights Act 1998, s 3 (on the constitutional implications of which see A Kavanagh, Constitutional 
Review under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009)).  
33 P Sales, ‘Partnership and Challenge: The Courts’ role in Managing the Integration of Rights and Democracy’ 
[2016] PL 456, 457.  
  
protection for fundamental rights and principles; while Lord Hoffmann was able to proclaim 
the ability of the common law to restrain the application of unclear or uncertain legislative 
measures, he simultaneously conceded that (where legislative purpose is clear) Parliament 
continues to enjoy the ability to legislate absent legal constraints.
34
 Second, the principle of 
legality’s potency as a mechanism of constitutional restraint is undermined by difficulties 
relating to its application. It is axiomatic that the principle is contingent on the recognition 
and applicability of a right or fundamental principle existent at common law. Yet common 
law rights are—by their very nature—lacking in the definitional certainty of rights allocated 
under a Bill of Rights or other legislative instrument. Whatever vagueness persists in the 
definition of each right guaranteed in a Bill of Rights,
35
 courts can be more sure-footed by 
reliance on both the wording of the rights provision and the context of the overall instrument. 
As such, and as creatures of the common law, the normative force of legislative endorsement 
to the catalogue of common law rights is also absent. In any invocation of the principle of 
legality it is imperative that the court address these issues of imprecision, lest the principle 
become a vehicle for the development of powerful, yet vague, limitations on legislative 
power. 
Constitutional differentiation therefore gives rise to complex interpretive questions 
that have yet to be authoritatively answered. According priority to constitutional legislation 
over ordinary statutes and constitutional norms over ordinary policy is only the beginning, as 
courts must discover or formulate techniques to definitively identify constitutional rights, 
principles and statutes
36
, determine the breadth of these constitutional precepts and resolve 
conflicts between them.
37
 These pursuits are central to developing a mature constitutional 
jurisprudence, supplying the means for settling the substantive requirements of the 
constitution over time. The first point of departure in confronting these constitutional 
questions is that rather than constructing hard lines between constitutional and ordinary 
interpretive techniques, it is more accurate to view constitutional techniques as the evolution 
of ‘ordinary’ common law statutory interpretation and to understand both approaches as 
mutually educative. The difference between the two is more properly regarded as one of 
                                                 
34 Simms (n 4) 131. See also R (Jackson) v Attorney-General [2006] 1 AC 262, [159].    
35 On which see JAG Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1, esp 12–16.   
36 While Laws LJ identified a number of ‘constitutional statutes’ in Thoburn, his definition has been 
simultaneously criticised for being overly broad (G Marshall, ‘Metric Measures and Martyrdom by Henry VIII 
Clause’ (2002) 118 LQR 493, 495-496) and unduly narrow (Ahmed and Perry, ‘Quasi-entrenchment’ n (26).  
37 While Thoburn provides guidance on the reconciliation of conflict between an ordinary and a constitutional 
statute, the Supreme Court has declined to offer clear guidance on the resolution of conflict between two 
constitutional instruments (HS2 (n 24) [208]).  
  
degree rather than kind, which is not to elide constitutional and statutory interpretation but to 
better appreciate the nature and extent of the similarities and distinctions between these 
interpretive approaches. The connection between both sets of interpretive approaches is 
unsurprising, in part, because the issues which they seek to resolve track across constitutional 
and ordinary interpretation. Those central interpretive questions include firstly, whether ‘the 
interpretation of a law [should] be governed mainly by its “letter”, or by its “spirit”’, and 
secondly, the extent to which the meaning of a written instrument should ‘be determined by 
the original intentions, purposes, or understandings’ of its drafters.38 The interpretive 
continuity between constitutional and ordinary interpretation can be seen in the assistance 
constitutional courts interpreting codified constitutions in other common law nations have 
derived from familiar techniques of ordinary interpretation, for instance through marshalling 
reading in and reading down techniques as remedies.
39
  
This continuity approach can be further buoyed by reference in UK courts to 
constitutional interpretative techniques adopted in other common law states, techniques 
which have shown some resonance in the implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998 and 
devolution legislation.
40
 Signs of such incorporation are clearly in evidence in Robinson v 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland,
41
 where—through application of a ‘generous and 
purposive’ approach—a majority of the House of Lords was able to uphold the validity of 
elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly positions of First Minister and Deputy First 
Minister, notwithstanding that those elections had fallen outside of the timeframe apparently 
set down by the Northern Ireland Act 1998.
42
 The requirement of generous and purposive 
interpretation has become a mainstay of constitutional and bill of rights interpretation in 
Commonwealth countries, and has been steadily recognised as applicable to the expanding 
category of UK constitutional statutes.
43
 As Robinson itself demonstrates however, the 
adoption of interpretative approaches which seek to give effect to legislation in the light of a 
contextual assessment of legislative purpose may be in apparent tension with statutory 
                                                 
38 J Goldsworthy, ‘Introduction’ in J Goldsworthy (ed), Interpreting Constitutions (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2007) 2. 
39 R Leckey, Bills of Rights in the Common Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015) 40. 
40 See Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681, 703 (Lord Bingham, citing Edwards v Attorney-General for Canada 
[1930] AC 124, 136 (Lord Sankey LC)).  
41 Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] NI 390, [11]; D Feldman, ‘The Nature And 
Significance of “Constitutional” Legislation’ (2013) 129 LQR 343, 355–57.  
42 See Northern Ireland Act 1998, s 16.  
43 See, eg, R v Director of Public Prosecutions, ex p Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326, 375; R Masterman, ‘Taking the 
Strasbourg Jurisprudence into Account: Developing a “Municipal Law of Human Rights” under the Human 
Rights Act’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 907, 913-15. 
  
language, and therefore with those who would position the courts as responsive and (broadly) 
deferential to parliamentary language as the substance of primary legislation.
44
 As such —
and further illustrating continuity with the corpus of the common law—while generous and 
purposive methods of construction may be emergent features of the constitutional common 
law, they are by no means routinely embraced even in relation to the interpretation of 
constitutional legislation.
45
 
III. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL RESTRAINTS 
 
The constitutionalisation of the common law through these methodological advances can be 
seen to pose challenges to multiple facets of common law unity. Fundamentally, the internal 
coherence of the common law is central to its utility as a stabilising force, a coherence that is 
potentially undermined to the extent that judicial reasoning employs constitutional techniques 
that outstrip current doctrinal progress. Though the common law is inherently evolutionary, 
its transformative impulses have been held in occasionally uneasy balance with 
countervailing tendencies towards stability and cohesion. The general tenor of judicial 
restraint in the development of the common law is tacit recognition that ‘the common law is a 
process of law-making developed in a pre-democratic era, and maintained by a non-
democratic form.’46   
The internal restraint on common law adaptability in the form of the doctrine of 
precedent seeks to contain the ‘evolutionary quandary’ occasioned by common law 
developments.
47
 Beyond the dilemma of reconciling the constancy and changeability of the 
common law, lies the danger that methodological engines of change will outpace doctrinal 
substance, thereby undermining both the stability and practicality of the common law. The 
common law’s characteristic incrementalism hampers doctrinal and principle development to 
an extent that is not seen for methodology. The incremental method, in this regard at least, 
can be seen to tend towards the fragmentary; as Sir Robert Megarry VC noted in Malone, 
‘[n]o new right in the law, fully fledged with all the appropriate safeguards, can spring from 
the head of a judge deciding a particular case’.48 Though the common law may expand 
                                                 
44 Robinson (n 41) [65] (Lord Hobhouse).  Cf Feldman (n 41) 492–496.  
45 Imperial Tobacco, Petitioner 2013 SC (UKSC) 153, [14].   
46 KD Ewing, ‘A Theory of Democratic Adjudication: Towards a Representative, Accountable and Independent 
Judiciary’ (2000) 38 Alberta Law Review 708, 711. 
47 AC Hutchinson, Evolution and the Common Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005) 125. 
48 Malone v Metropoitan Police Commissioner [1979] 1 Ch 344, 372.  
  
through the occasional development of new causes of action,
49
 there has been no judicial 
attempt to list or compile those existing fundamental rights which are recognised, and may be 
protected, by virtue of the common law.
50
 This may well be further evidence of the common 
law’s incrementalism, but is also a symptom of the definitional uncertainty which attaches to 
common law rights; even Laws LJ—a full-throated defender of fundamental rights—has 
remarked that case law does not fully explain the meaning of the label ‘constitutional 
rights’.51 
The danger of an imbalance between methodology and substance is also demonstrated 
in judicial use of constitutional principle (which is discussed in further detail below).  On the 
one hand, the common law’s incremental development can be seen as a consequence of the 
(relative) certainty and predictability required of the rule of law, with constitutional principle 
serving to condition the extent to which legal change may be judicially-engineered.
52
 The 
core requirements of the rule of law act as a brake on accelerated development by way of the 
common law, and serve to ensure that any such development remains ‘judicial’ rather than 
‘legislative’ in character.53 On the other hand, the precariousness of this imbalance is on full 
display in the pages of the Jackson judgment, which spoke to the constitutional 
fundamentality of rule of law as a means of restraining governmental powers but added little 
definition to the content of the principle, its normative force and the consistency of both with 
other potentially conflicting constitutional norms.
54
  
The external aspect of the common law’s unity encompasses on the one hand, the 
reconciliation of the methodology with prevailing norms of the polity, including—in the UK 
and Australia—parliamentary supremacy, and in other common law countries, the 
underpinning normative imperative of democratic will as represented in popular sovereignty 
(as expressed in statutes) and constituent power (as expressed in the Constitution). In a 
                                                 
49 See eg Hosking v Runting [2004] 1 NZLR 1.  
50 Extra-judicially, Lord Cooke of Thorndon attempted to list those rights which the common law recognised as 
‘constitutional’; he included: ‘… the right of access to a court; the right of access to legal advice; and the right to 
communicate confidentially with a legal adviser under the seal of legal professional privilege … [the right of] 
participation in the democratic process, equality of treatment, freedom of expression, religious freedom … [and] 
the right to a fair trial’ (Lord Cooke of Thorndon, ‘The Road Ahead for the Common Law’ (2004) 53 ICLQ 273, 
276–277). 
51 R v Lord Chancellor, ex parte Witham [1998] QB 575, 585. 
52 Lord Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’ [2007] CLJ 67,71 
53 On which see A Kavanagh, ‘The Elusive Divide between interpretation and legislation under the Human 
Rights Act 1998’ (2004) 24 OJLS 259, 270–274; G Phillipson and A Williams, ‘Horizontal Effect and the 
Constitutional Constraint’ (2011) 74 MLR 878, 887.   
54 Jackson (n 36) [107] (Lord Hope), [159] (Lady Hale). See also Reference re Manitoba Language Rights 
[1985] 1 SCR 721 (SC, Canada) [59]; R v Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society [1992] 2 SCR 606 (SC, 
Canada)[43]. 
  
second, and increasingly important respect, the external face of the common law’s unity 
speaks to its ability to foster connections and communications across common law states.  
Speaking to the second external manifestation, the importance of inter-common law 
communications has been highlighted by influential judicial figures, including Lord Toulson 
and Lord Cooke of Thorndon.
55
 Lord Toulson has recommended ‘the benefit which can be 
gained from knowledge of the development of the common law elsewhere’, in a judgment in 
which he encouraged the ‘citation of decisions of senior courts in other common law 
jurisdictions’.56   
The external constraint imposed by parliamentary supremacy is perhaps a more 
serious indicator of potential inconsistencies between common law constitutionalism’s 
ascendancy and longstanding constitutional pillars. The legislative supremacy of the elected 
branches must be accounted for in any convincing and durable constitutional development. 
There is consensus that the constitutional imperative of legislative supremacy rests in its 
expression of the majority will but to view it as an immutable grundnorm is misleading.
57
 
Parliamentary supremacy rests on the acceptance of both political and legal actors 
(constituted powers) and maintains its position on the basis of continued normative 
justification within the legal and political landscape.
58
 Far from being simply ‘a political 
fact’, parliamentary supremacy is, and must be, defensible.59 Consequently, the evolving 
shape of the doctrine must be—and has been—justified by normative reasoning. Such 
reasoning is evident in Lord Bridge’s approach in Factortame,60 which sought to uphold (and 
explain) the supremacy of EU law partly through discussion of the voluntary acceptance of 
limitations on Parliament’s power and the necessity of EU law supremacy for the 
effectiveness of the Union’s system of laws and regulations.61 This approach achieved greater 
refinement and maturity in HS2, in which the UK Supreme Court developed a more assertive 
vision of both British constitutionalism and the courts’ role in articulating the features of that 
constitutional landscape.
62
 In explaining that the supremacy of EU law is insufficient to settle 
                                                 
55 Lord Cooke of Thorndon, ‘Master Goff’s Common Law Through Commonwealth Eyes’ (The Inner Temple, 
1996); Lord Toulson, ‘International Influence on the Common Law’ (London Common Law and Commercial 
Bar Association, 2014). 
56 R (Guardian News & Media Ltd) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2013] QB 618, [88]. 
57 NW Barber, ‘Sovereignty Re-examined: The Courts, Parliament, and Statutes’ (2000) 20 OJLS 131, 140–49. 
58 TRS Allan, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty: Law, Politics and Revolution’ (1997) 113 LQR 443 
59 P Craig, ‘Public Law, Political Theory and Legal Theory’ [2000] PL 211, 211.  
60 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603. 
61 P Craig, ‘Britain in the European Union’ in J Jowell, D Oliver and C O'Cinneide (eds), The Changing 
Constitution (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015) 123. 
62 HS2 (n 24). 
  
a conflict between EU law and a domestic constitutional norm, the Court was clear that such 
a conflict could only be resolved by the application of UK constitutional law in UK courts. 
The common law undoubtedly plays a role in allowing the courts to give voice to 
parliamentary supremacy, a role which has become all the more crucial in the years of 
constitutional renovation since the enactment of the European Communities Act 1972. This 
much is evident in Miller, where the necessity of parliamentary approval for the delivery of a 
formal notice of withdrawal from the EU was settled through the ‘application of basic 
concepts of constitutional law’.63 It is partly through common law reasoning—applying both 
principles of statutory interpretation and analogical historical argument—that innovations 
such as the supremacy of EU law and the interpretive and declaratory powers under the 
Human Rights Act 1998 have been integrated into the constitutional landscape and reconciled 
with its existing features.  
 Fundamentally, common law constitutional techniques quite consciously seek to 
thread the needle between defence of distinctly constitutional norms and respect for 
legislative will. As such, the principle of legality provides an interpretive mechanism through 
which courts can enforce common law rights and common law constitutional principles, 
while simultaneously acknowledging that a clear, unambiguous statement from Parliament 
would settle the matter. In this way the interpretive presumption serves to reconcile 
parliamentary supremacy and the rule of law and maintain effective inter-institutional 
interaction in the development of the constitution.
64
 In sum, while at first glance the external 
unity of the common law appears under threat by the march of its constitutionalism, closer 
inspection reveals greater complexity in the external aspect of common law unity, which—at 
the least—indicates conceptual connections between prevailing constitutional norms and the 
common law as well as a reinforcement of the bonds between common law jurisdictions 
through common law constitutional dialogue.  
 
IV.  THE DEPLOYMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
 
The common law’s doctrinal recognition of constitutional rights pre-dated the enactment of 
the Human Rights Act 1998, and sought to give a degree of legal recognition to the rights of 
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the individual in a constitutional system that had hitherto focused on wrongs and remedies. 
The means by which such rights could be asserted as against legislative action was relatively 
clear. To take the finding of the High Court in Witham as an example: the court found that the 
right of access to a court was a ‘fundamental constitutional right’65 recognised by the 
common law, and that it could not be limited other than by express wording in primary 
legislation or by secondary legislation whose parent statute provided for the power to make 
such restriction; ‘general words,’ Laws J indicated, ‘will not suffice’ for this purpose.66 The 
stipulation was therefore that a right recognised by the common law as fundamental ‘can only 
be denied by the government if it persuades Parliament to pass legislation which 
specifically—in effect by express provision—permits the executive’ to place a limitation on 
that right.
67
   
Yet in spite of the fact that, as a tool of proto-constitutional review, the recognition of 
freestanding common law rights amounted to a considerable advance for the common law, 
the traditional terrain of judicial review of administrative action did not demonstrate the same 
capacity to reinvent itself in order to provide better judicial protection for individuals.
68
 Even 
in those cases in which common law rights could be said to be engaged, ‘… the courts’ 
capacity to protect the relevant rights was limited by broad adherence to the conventional 
machinery of domestic administrative law.’69 Additionally, this burgeoning jurisprudence of 
common law rights was undoubtedly stifled by the implementation of the Human Rights Act 
1998. The Act—by contrast with the common law—provided a defined and expanded 
catalogue of rights,
70
 specified how those rights might be asserted against both legislation
71
 
and public bodies
72
 and made remedies available in the event that one of the protected rights 
had been unjustifiably infringed.
73
 Problems of the definition and scope of the protected 
rights, issues which the common law had yet to confront in any meaningful way, were also to 
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be partially determined by reference to the extensive jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights.
74
  
Following the enactment of the Human Rights Act, it was occasionally suggested that 
further expansion of fundamental common law rights jurisprudence might be a possibility,
75
 
but the view from the highest court appeared to suggest that constitutional common law rights 
were destined to remain a semi-formed quirk of the pre-Human Rights Act era.
76
 The tide has 
however turned, with recent decisions emphasising the common law’s continuing 
‘dynamic’77 force in the arena of individual rights. Given broader socio-political concerns 
surrounding the ‘Europeanisation’ of the domestic laws of human rights, the assertion of a 
domestic alternative, or complement, to the ‘incoming tide’78 of Convention jurisprudence 
can be easily appreciated. There is also force in the arguments—made powerfully by Lord 
Reed in Osborn—that the Convention and its associated case-law is generally phrased at such 
a level of abstraction as to demand implementation at the ‘national level through a 
substantial body of much more specific domestic law’.79   
Though the common law framework of rights continues to evolve – with recent 
decisions acknowledging the existence of common law rights to liberty,
80
 open justice,
81
 and 
against self-incrimination
82
 – its potential to independently act as a meaningful constraint on 
governmental power should not be overstated.  First, and even acknowledging the sequential 
preference for consideration of common law authorities in domestic human rights 
adjudication,
83
 the Supreme Court has acknowledged that application of the Convention 
rights – and the proportionality standard that the common law has hitherto declined to fully 
embrace
84
 – will often require a more exacting standard of review.85 Second, imprecision in 
the realm of common law rights has been compounded by a tendency towards restraint and 
deference to legislative will. In Moohan for instance, Lord Hodge—with whom four of the 
remaining six Justices agreed—was prepared to acknowledge that the right to vote could be 
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viewed as a ‘basic or constitutional right’86 but declined to find that the common law required 
that any derogations be ‘provided for by law and … proportionate’ as a result.87 This was as a 
result of the fact that the common law’s role had essentially been displaced by statute. In 
Lord Hodge’s words:88 
… for centuries the right to vote has been derived from statute. The UK Parliament 
through its legislation has controlled and controls the modalities of the expression of 
democracy. It is not appropriate for the courts to develop the common law in order to 
supplement or override the statutory rules which determine our democratic franchise. 
This finding is entirely consistent with the notion that the courts will be ‘slow to develop the 
common law by entering, or re-entering, a field regulated by legislation’.89 It is, of course, 
simultaneously inconsistent with an imperative to prioritise rights and require justification for 
interferences and confirms the current development of common law rights as lacking both the 
rigour and normative reach of their Convention-based counterparts.
90
 Both characteristics 
combine to reduce the potential for the doctrinal application of common law rights to upset 
the orthodox hierarchy of norms stemming from the supremacy of the legislature. The same 
cannot necessarily be said for the judicial application of countervailing constitutional 
principles—a matter to which we now turn.   
 
V.  ‘PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONALITY’? 
 
The doctrinal unity of the common law’s approach to judicial review is potentially challenged 
by its adoption of a more constitutionalised approach to adjudication. The adoption of an 
overtly constitutional approach sees a further bifurcation in the common law, as a result of 
which the relative terra firma of administrative law is abandoned in the application of more 
abstract, and principle-based, reasoning. The move away from administrative law doctrine 
forces recourse to principles of supposed general applicability which may lack the substance 
to effectively underpin legitimate judicial decision-making and which expose the limits of 
principle unity within common law constitutional adjudication.  
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Classical understandings of the common law and the British constitution view both as 
essentially pragmatic systems that develop and evolve by finding practical solutions to 
problems. The drift towards reliance on constitutional principles raises questions to which 
Loughlin has given voice, chief among those being the ability ‘to identify principles (the 
relatively easy bit) but also to unpack them and set them to work to resolve particular social 
disputes concerning the appropriate exercise of public power’.91 Lord Hoffmann’s speech in 
Simms saw an explicit linkage drawn between the meta-regulatory potential of the common 
law and the formal powers of constitutional review exercised by supreme or constitutional 
courts in comparator systems. Similarly, in Thoburn, Laws LJ indicated that the common 
law’s recognition of constitutional statutes ‘gives us most of the benefits of a written 
constitution, in which fundamental rights are accorded special respect’.92 On this reading the 
principle of legality is positioned explicitly as a constitutionalist restraint – rather than a 
merely interpretative tool – hinting at its development as a means by which a relatively 
abstract common law constitution might be enforced. In parallel, emphasising the 
constitutional credentials of the principle serves to enhance the normative standing of the 
common law and implicitly rejects the traditional account of the ‘negative’ mandate in favour 
of judicial law-making, which regarded ‘parliamentary interference [in the common law 
sphere] as unobjectionable.’93 That such interference may no longer be seen as entirely 
unproblematic—and that this constitutional common law may enjoy a degree of resilience—
has been indicated by the UK Supreme Court. In the HS2 decision, the Supreme Court 
confirmed that constitutional law might be considered as apart from other law, and that 
constitutional principles might be resistant to even the superiority of EU law:
94
 
The United Kingdom has no written constitution, but we have a number of 
constitutional instruments. … The common law also recognises certain principles as 
fundamental to the rule of law. It is, putting the point at its lowest, certainly arguable 
(and it is for United Kingdom law and courts to determine) that there may be 
fundamental principles, whether contained in other constitutional instruments or 
recognised at common law, of which Parliament when it enacted the European 
Communities Act 1972 did not either contemplate or authorise the abrogation.  
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As with common law rights, the articulation of constitutional principles poses particular 
difficulties when those principles are deployed as determinative, or partially determinative, 
tools of adjudicative reasoning. First, there may be disagreement as to the underpinnings or 
centrality of the claimed principle. A salient example—and one that has already been alluded 
to—is provided by the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. In the notable decision of 
Jackson, Lord Steyn said the following:
95
 
The classic account given by Dicey of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, 
pure and absolute as it was, can now be seen to be out of place in the modern United 
Kingdom.  Nevertheless, the supremacy of Parliament is still the general principle of 
our constitution.  It is a construct of the common law.  The judges created this 
principle. 
The consequence of this, as Lord Steyn went on to make plain, was that parliamentary 
sovereignty itself is a principle that might be moulded or amended by the judges.   
Far then from being a grundnorm, sovereignty is—on this view at least—both a product of 
the common law, and potentially subject to its limiting force.
96
 On this account, the 
supremacy of the legislature may be the ‘dominant’ characteristic of the constitution,97 but it 
does not necessarily have overriding force. It is the nominal first amongst otherwise equal, 
but nonetheless potentially yielding, principles inhering within the system. The consequence 
of this for Lord Steyn was that—faced with legislative abrogation of another fundamental 
feature of the constitution—the courts would have to consider whether that characteristic was 
one that ‘even a sovereign Parliament acting at the behest of a complaisant House of 
Commons cannot abolish’.98 It fell to Lord Hope to confirm that while sovereignty may 
empower and legitimise the legislature, its necessary parallel is legal accountability to the 
courts; ‘[t]he rule of law enforced by the courts is the ultimate controlling factor on which our 
constitution is based’.99 The extent to which the rule of law might exert a restraining 
influence upon legislative powers was touched upon by Baroness Hale and Lord Steyn who 
postulated that the severe legislative restriction of judicial review, or insulation of executive 
activity from judicial scrutiny, may fall foul of the rule of law.   
Though it is the obiter comments of Lord Steyn and Baroness Hale that were the most 
eye-catching, their suggestion that legislative sovereignty should yield in the face of 
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pernicious legislation which infringed the rule of law was not shared by the other judges.  
The then Senior Law Lord, Lord Bingham, in particular did not so readily agree that 
Parliament legislated subject to external controls:
100
 
The bedrock of the British constitution is, and in 1911 was, the supremacy of the 
Crown in Parliament ... Then, as now, the Crown in Parliament was unconstrained by 
any entrenched or codified constitution. It could make or unmake any law it wished. 
Statutes, formally enacted as Acts of Parliament, properly interpreted, enjoyed the 
highest legal authority.  
Lord Bingham’s use of the present tense is telling. While a number of his judicial colleagues 
clearly countenanced a shift in the constitutional landscape, Lord Bingham was less willing to 
concede that Parliament legislates subject to external constraints and made no reference to the 
common law heritage of the sovereignty principle. Two points can be illustrated through this 
judicial divergence. First, it is clear (perhaps trite) that significant disagreement exists as to 
the nature and scope of the potentially applicable constitutional principles. It is 
uncontroversial to say that even the foremost of those—parliamentary sovereignty—is a 
contested concept.
101
 Such disagreement is also evident in those cases in which other 
constitutional principles are judicially advanced.
102
 But the assertion that recognition of the 
legislative supremacy of parliament is a purely judicial creation, comes close to placing 
constitutional weight on the common law that its non-democratic structures cannot fully bear.   
Second, the parallel appeal to the controlling influence of countervailing 
constitutional principles requires equal care in its unpacking.  Judicial resort to broad 
constitutional principles is a less compelling mode of judicial argumentation than recourse to 
rather more precise sub-principles, or rules.
103
 While the articulation of constitutional 
principles in the abstract is a common feature of judicial decision-making, those broad 
principles are best applied when distilled down into rather more precise, applicable, rules. 
This latter point is displayed in stark relief when the broad principle in question is being used 
in an attempt to qualify an exercise of Parliament’s legislative power. In this regard, the 
contestability of legislative sovereignty is rather less problematic—due, perhaps, to the 
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democratic imprimatur that adheres to primary legislation—than the clarity and scope of 
whichever constitutional principle is invoked in order to limit legislative power.   
 
VI.  PRINCIPLE-BASED REASONING IN R (EVANS) v ATTORNEY-GENERAL 
 
The Supreme Court decision in R (Evans) v Attorney-General
104
 provides an illustration of 
the potential difficulties of reliance on constitutional principle in preference to doctrinal 
administrative law.  The facts of the case revolved around the Attorney-General’s issue of a 
certificate—pursuant to section 53 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000105—which had 
the effect of preventing disclosure of correspondence between the Prince of Wales and 
various government departments.
106
  Evans, a journalist for the Guardian, pursued judicial 
review proceedings, seeking to quash the Attorney-General’s certificate. The Divisional 
Court had dismissed his claim, while the Court of Appeal allowed his subsequent appeal (and 
granted the Attorney-General permission to appeal to the Supreme Court). The pertinent issue 
before the Supreme Court concerned the validity of the Attorney-General’s certificate, with 
Evans arguing that section 53 ‘did not permit a certificate to be issued simply because, on the 
same facts and arguments, the accountable person took a different view of the public interest 
… when it came to the issue of disclosure’.107 
 
A.  A question of constitutional or administrative law? 
The multiple judgments delivered by the seven-Justice bench in Evans were differentiated not 
only by their conflicting conclusions on the central question before the court. The judges 
were fundamentally divided on the appropriate framing of the issue regarding the validity of 
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the Attorney General’s Certificate. Two critical approaches are evident, with Lord Neuberger 
(joined by Lord Kerr and Lord Reed) characterising the question as a constitutional issue and 
Lord Mance (who was joined by Lady Hale) treating the matter as a question of 
administrative law. In summary, the core focus of the administrative law enquiry was the 
legitimacy and/or reasonableness of the reasons underpinning the Attorney-General’s 
certification. Lord Neuberger’s constitutional law enquiry was more clearly focused on the 
compatibility of a power to issue such a certificate with the rule of law. The main dissent 
from Lord Wilson sought to deliver a response to both approaches, and can be characterised 
as conservatively constitutionalist as the more forceful elements of his speech were squarely 
directed at disputing Lord Neuberger’s rule of law-driven ‘constitutional’ reasoning. The 
remaining Justice, Lord Hughes, also framed the issue as one of administrative law, though 
he departed from the findings of Lord Mance and Baroness Hale on the sufficiency of the 
reasons advanced in support of the Attorney General’s decision.   
It is the constitutional path chosen by Lord Neuberger that most clearly evidences the 
potential of the constitutional common law, and most clearly illustrates some of its potential 
pitfalls. Lord Neuberger’s judgment focuses on the notion that executive override of a 
judicial decision ‘cut[s] across two constitutional principles which are also fundamental 
components of the rule of law.’108 The two fundamentals were identified as first, ‘the basic 
principle that a decision of a court is binding …and cannot be ignored or set aside by anyone, 
including (indeed it may fairly be said, least of all) the executive’ and second, that ‘decisions 
and actions of the executive are, subject to necessary well-established exceptions … 
reviewable by the court at the suit of an interested citizen’.109  
While Lord Mance, Lady Hale and Lord Hughes (the latter dissenting in part) saw the 
crux of the decision as lying in the adequacy of the reasons advanced by the Attorney-
General for issuing the certificate under section 53 (with Lord Mance and Lady Hale finding 
those reasons inadequate for the purposes of issuing the certificate), the constitutional 
approach served to lift the issue from the minutiae of the Attorney-General’s decision. Due to 
what Lord Neuberger described as the ‘constitutional aspect’110 of the case, both the issue of 
the certificate’s validity and the consequences of the court’s determination of that issue, 
became more general and broader in scope. This generalising of the issue occurred in two 
ways. First, far from viewing the matter as a concern discretely related to British 
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constitutional law and principles, Lord Neuberger appealed to ‘global’ legal values, stating 
that an interpretation of section 53(2) of the Freedom of Information Act ‘which entitles a 
member of the executive … to overrule a decision of the judiciary merely because he does 
not agree with it would not merely be unique in the laws of the United Kingdom’.111 Using 
this framing, the implications of the interpretation of section 53(2) would therefore extend 
beyond the provincial by undermining universal values which attach to the rule of law. 
Second, beyond a geographical expansion of the scope of the issue, elevating the issue from 
the detail of administrative law and situating it within the constitutional components of the 
rule of law suggests that the applicable principles are so fundamental that they not only 
contain independently applicable norms, but are also impervious to differing views on 
controversial questions. Lord Neuberger was overt on this score, as after describing the two 
principles, he explained their normative import in the following terms:
112
 
… the fact that the member of the executive can put forward cogent and/or strongly 
held reasons for disagreeing with the court is, in this context, nothing to the point: 
many court decisions are on points of controversy where opinions (even individual 
judicial opinions) may reasonably differ, but that does not affect the applicability of 
these principles.  
This account of the rule of law approaches the understanding of constitutional norms that 
obtains in nations with entrenched constitutions, but is, of course, tempered by the 
acknowledgement that the principles apply domestically ‘subject to parliamentary 
supremacy’.113   
 
B.  Enforcing the Rule of Law 
Evans reinforces a trend in British constitutionalism—specifically the common law variety—
for prioritisation of the relationship between individual and state while being less attentive 
and more tepid in addressing the relationship between organs of state. Mention of the most 
dominant of organisational constitutional principles—separation of powers—only appears in 
Lord Wilson’s dissent.114 While Lord Neuberger’s judgment supplies some content to the 
often elusive rule of law by indicating two ‘constitutional principles’ that are said to be 
components of the rule of law, it avoids engagement with the more complex institutional 
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dilemmas engaged by both principles. In a larger sense, his judgment proves that the relative 
ease of identification of a constitutional principle is balanced—if not outweighed—by the 
difficulty of extracting and applying its component parts. While identifying the two relevant 
components as the principle that the decision of a court is binding (the finality principle) and 
the requirement that executive decisions be reviewable by the court (the reviewability 
principle), he failed to confront the complexities of both principles and the authorities that 
support their characterisation as enforceable ‘fundamental components’ of the rule of law.  
Regarding the first of these, Lord Neuberger arguably overstates the certainty with 
which the finality principle finds support in the common law. He sought to support the 
finality principle using dicta from M v Home Office,
115
 to the effect that the executive obeys 
the law as a matter of necessity rather than grace.  But in the light of section 53, the 
circumstances in Evans are qualitatively different from that particular judicial review case. 
An executive override in reliance on the primary legislative authority of section 53 of the 
Freedom of Information Act—as in Evans—is distinct from the bare refusal of the Home 
Office Minister to comply with a court order on the basis of advice that the court acted 
outside its jurisdiction. Lord Neuberger does concede that the finality principle is subject to 
the contrary views of a higher court or to statute,
116
 but goes on to say—even in the light of 
an available judicial review of the executive override—that ‘it can be said with some force 
that the rule of law would require a judge, almost as a matter of course, to quash the 
executive decision.’117  In portraying the finality principle as an effectively immovable 
object—even in the face of his apparent concession to parliamentary supremacy—Lord 
Neuberger offers only a partial account of the inter-institutional dynamics at play in Evans. 
The latter point is also evident in Lord Neuberger’s treatment of the reviewability 
principle.  While this principle has achieved broad support and application from at least 
GCHQ
118
 onwards, we are all too aware—particularly from cases involving the review of 
prerogative powers
119—that given the right amount of deference, a deferential review might 
differ little in practice from non-justiciability. Reviewability is therefore a concept of varying 
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colours and shades.
120
 As such, it is unsurprising perhaps that the Justices unanimously 
recognised the reviewability principle but differed on the question whether that principle had 
been breached. And while the focus of the minority was on the reasons provided in support of 
the ministerial override, Lord Neuberger’s deployment of the reviewability principle was 
subtly different. Lord Neuberger was particularly exercised by the potential for a certificate 
under section 53 to be issued on the basis of mere disagreement with a judicial finding in 
favour of disclosure,
121
 finding that section 53 did not permit the issue of a certificate where, 
‘on the basis of the same facts and issues as were before a judicial tribunal’,122 the 
accountable person merely comes to a different assessment of where the public interest 
should lie. For Lord Neuberger the breadth of the statutory power – rather than the specific 
circumstances of its use in the instant case – was inherently problematic. It is questionable 
whether Lord Neuberger needed to stress the potential for a certification decision to be taken 
absent convincing reasons, with a certificate issued simply on the basis of disagreement likely 
to lack the ‘reasonable grounds’ required by s.53. But Neuberger’s vision of reviewability – 
consistently with the broad tenor of his expansionary reasoning and reliance on overarching 
principle– is less focused on the reasons actually provided, and more driven by the bare 
compliance of the purported breadth of the statutory allocation of power with the overriding 
imperative of the rule of law.  As such, deployment of the reviewability principle in 
Neuberger’s judgment, is tantamount to an abstracted review of the statutory terms employed 
by Parliament in enacting s.53.   
The vehicle through which the twin requirements of the rule of law are vindicated in 
Evans is the principle of legality. While Evans does not seek to resolve outstanding issues 
relating to the extent to which the principle will adhere to common law rights, it provides 
confirmation that constitutional principles—at the very least the rule of law—will not be 
taken to yield in the face of ‘general or ambiguous’ statutory language. As such, it focuses 
attention on the normative aspirations of the principle of legality.  In the first instance, it 
appears to demonstrate that at the general level—as the conduit for the potentially wide-
reaching requirements of the rule of law—the principle of legality can operate as a 
substantive, external, limitation on legislative power. At the more specific level, Evans also 
provides (conflicting) indicators as to the precision with which legislation may have to be 
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formulated in order to limit rights and/or constitutional principles. Thus, it remains unclear 
what form of wording is required for the courts to adjudge that the statutory language is clear 
enough to demonstrate that Parliament has ‘squarely confront[ed] what it is doing and 
accept[ed] the political cost’.123 Certainly, the plurality and the partial dissent penned by Lord 
Hughes revealed starkly different views on the clarity of the terms of section 53(2). Lord 
Hughes had no hesitation in concluding that the section ‘can mean nothing other than that the 
accountable person … is given the statutory power to override the decision of the Information 
Commissioner, and/or of a court after appeal from the Commissioner, if he disagrees with it 
on reasonable grounds’.124 By contrast, in Lord Neuberger’s view, the section failed to satisfy 
the requirements of the principle of legality as it ‘falls far short of being crystal clear’.125 The 
level of clarity required in Parliament’s expression requires resolution to stave off charges of 
judicial disobedience, but more fundamentally, some settlement must be reached whether the 
principle of legality has developed to accommodate potential disobedience to parliamentary 
expression/intent in the face of a countervailing and fundamental constitutional principle.  
The cumulative impact of Lord Neuberger’s principles of finality and of 
reviewability—as given effect in Evans—is considerable, in practice leaving section 53 an 
empty shell capable of application only in the narrowest of circumstances.
126
 By contrast, the 
two principles of constitutionality combine to give considerable depth and reach to the 
common law’s capacity to give voice to the rule of law. Lord Neuberger’s iteration of the 
principle of legality additionally sets a high bar for the extent of statutory clarity required in 
order to legitimately restrict fundamental rights or the rule of law. The sum of this is the 
delivery of something akin to a stronger form of judicial review than has traditionally been 
evident in UK constitutional practice. In consequence, Elliott has assessed Evans as having 
performed ‘radical constitutional surgery pursuant to the principle of legality.’127 Others have 
been less charitable, accusing Lord Neuberger of effectively excising section 53 from the 
statute book.
128
 While Evans most certainly contributes to debates around the incremental 
constitutionalisation of the common law – both through adding breadth to the principle of 
legality and through the overt judicial application of free-standing constitutional principle – it 
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also serves to emphasise that in departing from the terra firma of administrative law (and 
perhaps also from the security of the sovereignty doctrine) both caution and clarity are 
required.  If the unity and stability of the common law is to be maintained then it is beholden 
on the court to – through the application of fully reasoned and supported decision-making – 
provide shape and substance to its constitutional dimension.   
 
VII.  TOWARDS A COHERENT CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW 
 
The importance of method should be underscored in a context in which the resurgence of 
common law rights and principles can be discounted and minimised by claims that 
parliamentary supremacy will thwart attempts at strong judicial enforcement of common law 
norms. The methodological advances of the doctrine of constitutional statutes and the 
principle of legality lay a path for articulating and applying constitutional doctrine in 
interpreting legislation. Nonetheless, the continued adoption of new and innovative 
methodological techniques risks outstripping, and thereby undermining, both the doctrinal 
content of the constitutional common law and prevailing (and potentially countervailing) 
constitutional norms. If it is to be a credible and durable force, the emergent constitutional 
common law must achieve reconciliation with existent common law and constitutional 
tradition.     
Similarly, if what we have referred to above as the meta-regulatory potential of 
common law constitutional principles is to be legitimately realised, then this cannot come at 
the expense of those characteristics that have in part secured the common law’s distinctive 
position within the polity. If the constitutional function of the courts is to uphold the rule of 
law,
129
 then the common law must, in both its substance and methodology, be reflective of 
such a commitment. Our concern is that seeking to substantiate—and enforce—principle-
based constitutionalist reasoning holds the potential to undermine the stability of the common 
law, and therefore its legitimacy. This is not to suggest that the constitutional capacity of the 
common law is incapable of orderly development. We tentatively suggest that the common 
law’s constitutionalist turn can be coherently and stably supported through observance of a 
studied approach that seeks to secure the constitutionalisation of the common law through its 
full reconciliation with internal and external restraints and completion (filling the gaps) of the 
doctrinal and principle foundations and requirements of common law constitutionalism. In 
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this light, the following approaches are recommended to usher along the balanced maturation 
of the nascent common law constitution. 
A.  Sustained Incrementalism 
It is in ‘the gradual construction of principle case by case’130 that judicial power is kept in 
check, in recognition of the restrictions that principle and expertise place upon judicial 
activity. Maintaining an incremental approach would serve the twin objectives of respect for 
prevailing constitutional doctrines of parliamentary supremacy, the rule of law and separation 
of powers, and acknowledge limitations on the competence of the judicial organ. Such an 
approach does not bar fundamental changes or judicially-driven constitutional moments. 
Rather, it seeks to ensure that judges ‘develop the law in a judicial rather than a legislative 
fashion; that is, on a piecemeal and principled basis that takes due account of pre-existing 
legal frameworks established by Parliament and previous judicial decisions’.131 As a 
methodological or procedural restraint, incrementalism permits reasoned maturation of 
common law constitutionalism while respecting the constraints demanded by the nature of the 
common law and the British constitution.  
The difficulty in articulating principles with any effective degree of specificity is, 
paradoxically, a result of the common law’s pragmatic, evolutionary pace.  While in the light 
of this the UK’s highest courts have generally been cautious in their application of arguments 
based solely on abstracted constitutional principles,
132
 this caution does not prevent the 
application and development of precedent by reliance on broader principles or judicial 
reasoning on both precise and general justificatory grounds. Lord Neuberger’s judgment in 
Evans—while clearly supportive of the values of the rule of law—was arguably lacking the 
reinforcment of those specific authorities that would have substantiated his broader vision of 
the concept. If the principle of legality is to support a species of partially-abstracted 
legislative review, it must do so consistently with the common law’s focus on the instant case 
in order to remain credible. In short, the courts may persist in giving substantive content to 
the rule of law, and thereby incrementally chart the contours of the common law’s 
understanding of a ‘rights-based democracy’133, but should not lose sight of those 
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methodological characteristics of the principle—relative certainty, stability, predictability—
that maintain its integrity and legitimacy.  
B.  Completing the constitutional circle 
The common law’s acceptance of a jurisprudence of fundamental rights—activated by a 
principle of legality capable of offering support where rights (and potentially constitutional 
principles) are undermined by inadvertent legislative action—undoubtedly provides a narrow 
basis for a fully-fledged constitutional jurisprudence. Recourse to the apex court in order to 
resolve, or partially resolve, constitutional problems—questions often at the intersection of 
law and political controversy
134—has arguably already resulted in the extension of the 
principle of legality, which might bite upon infringements of individual, specified rights,
135
 
bundles of rights,
136
 and (potentially unspecified
137
) constitutional principles.
138
 In the field of 
rights protection, the principle of legality is described as having become equal in force to the 
interpretative direction contained in section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act,
139
 and even some 
who see the principle as mandating a less robust protection of individual liberty nonetheless 
portray it as a vehicle for the broader management of judicio-legislative relations.
140
 For the 
principle of legality to fulfil these expanding ambitions, the content and institutional 
implications of the constitutional principles it is claimed to protect must—alongside 
fundamental rights—be further developed.  
The adverse consequence of the incremental development of the common law—for 
the development of a constitutional common law—has been to view precedents in isolation, 
rather than as components of a potentially cohering  body of constitutional rules and 
principles. Hence, we clearly envisage Entick v Carrington as confirming the principle of 
government under the law, but have a less defined sense of how that particular requirement 
links to, and coheres with, other, broader, requirements of the rule of law.
141
 The result of this 
is the tendency to narrowly regard precedents as judicially-applicable, and to be sceptical of 
principle-based reasoning of the type seen in Evans. If principle-based reasoning is to result 
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in the vindication of constitutional principle, then it is beholden on the court to clearly bridge 
the gap between the applicable precedent(s) and the constitutional maxim to be vindicated.  
If a constitutional common law is to flourish, and to range beyond the potentially 
inhibiting rights-focus of the principle of legality and common law rights jurisprudence, there 
is also a need for clearer articulation of constitutional principle and of the 
organisational/structural requirements of the constitution. Though Evans was in one sense 
very clearly about the interrelationship between Parliament, executive and courts, the virtual 
absence of explicit discussion of separation of powers
142
 is illustrative of a decision that—
while principle-based in its reliance on the rule of law—is otherwise lacking in its detailed 
consideration of a (perhaps the) key concept through which constitutional organisation and 
division can be articulated. Superficial engagement with separation of powers—also evident 
in other decisions of comparable constitutional standing
143—is perhaps unsurprising in a 
system which has tended to be reflective of only a partial separation of governmental 
institutions.
144
 Yet ongoing judicial failure to conceptualise the bases of institutional 
interactions reflects only an embryonic constitutional jurisprudence.   
C.  Critical comparativism  
There is longstanding evidence of judicial awareness of the assistance that common law 
adjudication in any one jurisdiction draws from the experiences and understandings 
developed in other jurisdictions.
145
 References to related cases in other states is also justified 
by, and builds on, the centrality of reason to common law method and development. 
Accepting reason as the basis for continual judicial refinement of the law, common law 
adjudication therefore resists firm jurisdictional containment. Thus, cross-jurisdictional 
common law unity is far from a relic of colonial days past.
146
 From at least the 1990s, 
common law appellate bodies have explicitly endorsed developing the common law in one 
jurisdiction by reference to the law of other common law states. While that effort was more 
regularly demonstrated in innovations in tort law,
147
 constitutionalisation of the common law 
has been greatly encouraged by reference to other states’ experience with constitutional law. 
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Rather than being undermined by strides in common law adjudication, cross-jurisdictional 
common law unity has been fostered by such developments. Though not speaking directly to 
common law constitutionalism, Lord Reed’s reflection ‘that the approach to proportionality 
adopted in our domestic case law under the Human Rights Act has not generally mirrored 
that of the Strasbourg court’, but has adopted ‘a more clearly structured approach … derived 
from case law under Commonwealth constitutions’, is testament to the synthesis occasioned 
by constitutional techniques in common law courts.
148
  
Moreover, inquiry into foreign law would compensate for the United Kingdom’s lack 
of prolonged experience with judicially-enforced constitutionalism. Highly instructive in this 
respect is the calibration of constitutional application of the rule of law in Canadian 
jurisprudence, culminating in increasingly specific derivation of principles from the rule of 
law, with a keen eye to precedents supporting claimed rule of law applications and to the 
restraining influences of constitutional text and countervailing constitutional principles. Thus 
the Canadian Supreme Court cautioned in Imperial Tobacco that however robust judicial 
enforcement of the rule of law, such protection must be conditioned by respect for 
parliament’s legislative authority and the terms of the Constitution.149 The tailored appeals to 
the rule of law in Canada and other common law jurisdictions could have provided 
meaningful guidance to Lord Neuberger’s Evans judgment by helping to justify his claim to 
the globality of the rule of law principle of finality of judicial decisions as well as 
contributing to the resolution between judicial application of the rule of law and legislative 
expression. The wisdom of such pedagogical references to foreign law is underscored by the 
relative youth of assertive constitutional—as opposed to administrative—reliance on rule of 
law arguments by UK courts. The trials, errors and lessons of courts more experienced in this 
endeavor ought to inform the forward march of the constitutional common law. 
  
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
The potential implications of the constitutionalisation of the common law can be seen in Lord 
Hodge’s warning in Moohan that if ‘a parliamentary majority abusively sought to entrench its 
power by a curtailment of the franchise or similar device, the common law, informed by 
principles of democracy and the rule of law and international norms, would be able to declare 
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such legislation unlawful.’150 While often cast as judicial supremacy, the requirement that 
Parliament act consistently with constitutional principle can alternatively be seen as a natural 
consequence of the advance of constitutionalism in the UK. Rather than automatically 
resulting in the dominance of the judicial branch, the result would be more appropriately cast 
as a form of discursive constitutionalist model along the lines of the ‘new Commonwealth 
model of constitutionalism’.151 In fact, cross-institutional discourse is precisely what is at the 
heart of the principle of legality: it places a manner and form requirement on legislative 
activity, the results of which are scrutinized by the court, with room for Parliament to 
(re)assert its legislative intention.   
Beyond tensions with parliamentary supremacy, if a constitutional common law is to 
flourish, avoiding the charge that its attendant rights and principles are essentially empty 
vessels, it must acquire the doctrinal underpinning and rigour that has accompanied the 
growth of administrative law in the post-War period.  Furtive steps are being taken in this 
direction, most evidently in the resurgence of constitutional common law rights in the Osborn 
line of cases and in the concretisation of the doctrine of constitutional statutes in HS2. 
Simultaneously however, failure—or reluctance—to reinforce the principled underpinnings 
of this constitutional common law will not only fuel accusations of an over-mighty judicial 
branch and subjectivity in judicial decision-making but will also undermine the broader unity 
and stability of the common law.   
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